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KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(A MLodern Rationale of the Law of Contracts)
By HUGH EVANDER WILLIS'
The understanding of the law of contracts requires a cor-
ret analysis of the subject and a rationale of all its main
theories and doctrines. It involves a new approach to the old
subject of contracts and a repudiation of much that is found in
the books. It means a correct solution of all the main contract
problems and, when these solutions have been found, a stating
of them in the terms of fundamental concepts. Most of the old
answers to the contract problems have been wrong, and for this
reason new solutions must be found. Old premises must be re-
examined, and new premises substituted therefor, tested by
logic at least before their substitution. The main fundamentals
,f the law of contracts must be stated in terms of what the
judges have done, not in terms of what they continue to say
that they have done; in terms of what the law now really is,
instead of in terms of what it once was or what the judges and
writers have said that it was. This does not mean to exclude or
ignore historical growth in contract law, but it means that mis-
takes in the rationale of the past must be corrected.
Contracts is one of the oldest branches of Anglo-American
law, and yet its rationalization has been very poor until recent
times. Lack of critical examination of law in this field has
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resulted both in a failure to discover some of the most funda-
mental principles and in the mistake of teaching many things
as contract law which were never contract law. Modern scholar-
ship has discovered so much about contracts that it should not
only be re-rationalized, but much of the worthless material
printed in the books on contracts should be discarded forever,
and people should be taught to stop hanging on to archaic ideas.
Modern scholarship has given us not merely one but at least
twelve different keys to the understanding of the law of con-
tracts. Some of these keys open only one door to the law of con-
tracts, others of the keys open a number of doors; but for the
understanding of the whole subject of contracts all of the keys
must be used.
What are the main general fundamentals of the law of
contracts stated in terms of modern rationalization?
Practicing attorneys may think that they do not need any keys.
They may think that the law of contracts is so simple and so well
settled that no one should have any difficulty about understanding
its principles. That they are mistaken can be easily demonstrated by
doing no more than considering the definition of a contract. If al-
most any group of attorneys was asked to define a contract, most of
them would define it in terms of an agreement. All of the text books
on contracts, with the exception of Williston's, so define it (following
Blackstone). This definition is fundamentally wrong. A contract
does not even have to have an agreement. A contract has to have
a promise, and Mr. Williston has defined it in terms of a promise; but
his definition is also wrong, because he does not define a contract
but only one of the operative facts necessary for it. A contract is a
right-duty relation. Since it is a relation in personam the phrase
legal obligation may be used. It is partly created by a party, or par-
ties, and partly by society. Hence a contract should be defined as a
legal obligation, created by a promise, or promises, of the parties, and
by the legal redress given therefor by society.
Within the last twenty-five years or so, a few modern contract
scholars have done a great deal of research work in the field of
contracts, and have re-rationalized practically the whole subject.
They claim that most of the old explanations are false. These never
really explained, but when this became obvious the old fashioned
method was to introduce a myth, like that of a common agent, when
the theory of agreement failed. However, this myth generally caused
more trouble than it cured, as in the case of the myth of the com-
mon agent, which made it harder to explain rejection and revocation.
Modern scholarship has apparently found the right answers to con-
tract problems (at least the old ones). They are the keys which
will open the doors to the understanding of all the many branches of
contract law. They and they alone explain problems and put con-
tracts on a basis of truth. They unlock the doors to true contract
knowledge and reveal long hidden secrets.
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I.
The first and most important prerequisite to a correct
understanding of the law of contracts is learning the scope of
freedom of contract. This will lead to the discovery that the law
Of contracts is a joint product of the parties to the contracts and
of society; and the determination of the role which private par-
ties and the role which society as a whole plays in the making, the
performance, the discharge, and the enforcement of contracts.
The most important thing in contract law is the answer to the
question of how far freedom of contract may go and how far
social control without freedom of contract may go.
We will first consider the scope of freedom of contract. The
private parties are almost always free to make or not to make a
contract. If they make a contract, one party, or in case of a bi-
lateral contract, both parties, are free to determine the rights
mid duties under the contract, that is, practically all matters of
substance are within the jurisdiction of the parties. The parties
may also measure bargain consideration, determine the condi-
tions for the performance of their contracts, and even promise
the impossible. Under freedom of contract the parties have
gradually acquired the power to assign their contract rights,
to give rights to third party beneficiaries, and to make joint
contracts, and of course now they have the freedom to make or
not to make any of these kinds of contracts. This private auton-
omy of the parties to contracts is something characteristic of
contract law. In other branches of the law, social control, or law,
is made by society either through legislative bodies or through
courts. In contracts the social control created by contracts is
created by the parties themselves. Contracts is an illustration of
personal liberty. Social control is a delimitation of personal
liberty. Yet by contracts private parties establish their own
social control, and this source of social control is probably the
greatest in the world. The social control thus created by the
parties is enforced by the courts and executive branches of gov-
ernment in the same way that social control created by legisla-
tures and courts is enforced. In a democracy the people rule
themselves. In a contract the parties to the contract really rule
themselves. This is democracy with a vengeance.
We will now consider the scope of the social control im-
posed by society upon the parties who make contracts.
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In the first place, it should be noted that the parties have
nothing whatever to do with the formalities of contract law.
Society prescribes the form in which the parties are allowed to
contract. There are some law teachers, at least in one of our
leading law schools, who contend that the parties have the
power to prescribe the formalities of contracts, at least if those
parties are businessmen. They seem to take the position that
whatever is the practice of businessmen determines what the law
is (or should be). Thus, if businessmen say that contracts is
a law of agreement, it is a law of agreement; and if they say
that a bill of lading is negotiable, it is negotiable; and appar-
ently if certain law professors (instead of businessmen) say
that all that is required by our law for a contract besides a
promise is the Roman law cautsa, causa is all that is required.
This is not what Anglo-American law has been and it is doubtful
if it ever will be this. Of course Lord MN[ansfield for a time almost
introduced the Roman law notion of causa into English law,
but his work in this respect was soon modified and it has stayed
modified up to date. Perhaps this rule would be a better rule,
but before it can become an Anglo-American rule it will have to
be made such by either legislative or judicial action. The same
thing must be said about any practices or desires of businessmen.
If these men can get their ideas adopted either by the courts
in judge-made law or by legislatures by the adoption of uni-
form acts or otherwise they may become law, but it is incorrect
to say that they are any part of our law, now. In Anglo-Ameri-
can law freedom of contract does not extend to matters of for-
malities, and any law teachers who say that it does are not stat-
ing Anglo-American law but are acting as evangelists for the
business class or for themselves.
At the present time there are four, and perhaps five, differ-
ent kinds of contracts, which in the course of the history of
Anglo-American law the legal order has created and made
available for the use of private parties in maling contracts. No
other forms are available. If parties attempt to make contracts
in any other way, their acts amount to nothing. If they use any
one of these forms, they may make a contract.
The oldest kind of contract developed for the use of private
parties was the promise under seal, developed in connection with
the action of covenant. This was a Norman form of contract
KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE LAWV OF CONTRACTS 169
(though an adaptation of the old formal contract of Anglo-Saxon
times), and the only kind of contract available in Norman
times, except the now obsolete Anglo-Saxon delivery promise
and surety promise. The promise under seal was practically the
only kind of contract allowed the parties until the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. It is still a kind of contract which
parties may use if they choose. Another kind of contract created
by English law for the use of the parties was the promise for
moral consideration developed in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries in connection with the action of general assump-
sit. Two other kinds of contracts developed by English law in
the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which
had a common origin in the action of special assumpsit were
the promise injuriously relied on and the promise or promises
in the form of offer and acceptance and bargain consideration.
All of these kinds of contracts are still in existence. The Ameri-
van Law Institute has classified as a contract of record an
acknowledgment in court by a recognizer that he is bound to
make a certain payment unless a specified condition is per-
formed, and this may therefore be called- a fifth kind of contract
available in Anglo-American law. Society also prescribes the
formalities for the discharge of contracts and gives the parties
a choice of about twenty methods of discharge.
The remedies available for breaches of contract are all pro-
vided by society. The parties are not allowed any say about
these matters, except as they are allowed to provide for limited
forms of arbitration. Society also provides the courts and legal
procedure for the administration of these remedies.
Society also provides for the voidability of contracts because
of infancy and insanity, because of duress, undue influence and
fraud, and because of failure to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Here a freedom is given to one party to a contract to avoid his
contract because the law desires to protect some other social
interests than freedom of contract and security of transactions,
but the party himself has nothing to do with the creation of
his liberty.
In addition to all of these functions which are performed by
society, society also exercises some social control over the free-
dom of the parties to make the contracts they desire. The chief
limitation on the freedom to make contracts is found in the topic
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of illegality. There are many subjects upon which society will
not permit people to contract. In other words, society exercises
social control to prevent the parties from creating any social
control of their own. There are many hundreds of matters which
are thus prohibited to the parties as the subject matter of con-
tract. Society also interferes with the making of contracts either
through requiring compulsory contracts, or requiring compul-
sory terms in contracts. Illustrations of compulsory contracts
are sometimes found in collective bargaining contracts, com-
pulsory employment contracts, compulsory membership in labor
unions, compulsory insurance contracts for automobilists, com-
pulsory licensing of patents and compulsory contracts obtained
by consent decrees. Illustrations of compulsory terms are found
in implied warranties, in minimum wage and hour provisions,
in contracts prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
for public utilities, in the standard contracts prescribed for
insurance companies and in the uniform sales act, uniform bill
of lading act and uniform warehouse receipts act. The judges
also have read into contracts constructive conditions where the
parties themselves have not in the exercise of their freedom
provided for express conditions.
All of the matters enumerated above which fall to the role
of society make a substantial list. Yet in spite of all of these
matters it probably is still true that in contract law the role of
the private parties bulks larger than the role of society as a
whole.
.Where the line is to be drawn between private autonomy
and public authority has not been a static thing. The amount of
freedom of contract has been constantly changing through the
centuries. The amount of freedom of contract had remarkable
growth in the period of maturity in Anglo-American law. But
since the coming of the period of socialization the pendulum has
swung the other way so far as concerns the common law, and
much less freedom of contract is allowed. In this period, for
example, practically the whole topic of public utilities has been
lifted out of the realm of contracts. In the United States, since
about 1890, the question of how much freedom of contract and
how much social control without contract we should have has
been answered by the United States Supreme Court.2 The United
2 WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 734-5, 743,
883, 890.
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States Supreme Court has not always taken a consistent position
upon this question, but has given a different answer in different
judicial constitutional periods. Chief Justice Mlarshall favored
freedom of contract and protected corporate charters as con-
tracts against state legislation. Chief Justice Taney and Justice
Miller favored social control. Justice Field and his associates,
when they commanded a majority upon the Supreme Court,
favored freedom of contract, and declared almost all legislation
limiting freedom of contract (e.g. hours of labor) to be a viola-
tion of due process of law. When Justice Holmes and his associ-
ates succeeded these men and dominated the decisions of the
Supreme Court more social control was allowed. But with the
ascent to the dominancy of the court of Justices Butler, McRey-
nolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter the Court went back to the
position of Field and his associates (minimum wages). The
present Court has, in its turn, overthrown the work of Justices
Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter and gone
back to the decisions of Justice Holmes and his associates, so
that at the present time it may be said that the tendency is in
the direction of upholding social control without contract and
delimiting freedom of contract.
Thus it is seen how important has been the role of private
autonomy and freedom of contract in the law of contracts. Free-
dom of contract is a sort of master-key to the understanding of
the law of contracts as a whole. Why this truth has not been
known in the past is hard to explain. 3 The importance of free-
dom of contract could not wholly have escaped the attention of
people in the years before us, and yet so far as the law of con-
tracts is concerned apparently there might not have been any
such phenomenon. To correctly understand the law of contracts
in the future, this key must be recovered and used.
II.
A second prerequisite to the understanding of the law of
contracts is the analysis of the subject into four separate and
' Up to date no case books on contracts, used in our schools, and
no textbooks on contracts and encyclopedias treating of the subject
of contracts, used by practitioners, have used this approach to the
understanding of the law of contracts. As a result most class A
teachers and practitioners are none too well grounded in contract
principles, and some business law and commercial law teachers have
a knowledge of the fundamentals of contracts so confused and super-
ficial that they do not know what the law of contracts is about.
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distinct kinds of contracts instead of one kind of contract. This
is a matter which concerns formalities. It is a part of the law
of contracts made by society without any help from the private
parties to contracts. However, society, in prescribing the formal-
ities which the parties must observe in making contracts, has
prescribed four different sets of formalities which constitute
four separate kinds of contracts. The parties are free under the
proper circumstances to use any one 'of the four forms of con-
tracts, but they cannot generally use more than one kind of
contract at a time; and whichever kind of contract they choose
to use they must make according to the law prescribed for this
kind of contract.4
These four kinds of contracts are (1) the promise under
seal, (2) the promise for moral consideration, (3) the promise
injuriously relied on, (4) the promise in the form of offer and
acceptance and bargain consideration.
There is only one common element running through all of
these contracts and that is promise. All the other elements of
each kind of contract differ ,from the elements of each of the
others.
The promise under seal requires no consideration and no
offer and acceptance and is never within the Statute of Frauds,
but it does require a promise, in writing, under seal, and deliv-
ered. The nature of the requirement of the seal has changed
from an impression on wax to a scroll or almost any device.5
In England, delivery, at first, had to be actual surrender, and in
the United States even today there must be some putting of a
document out of possession with apparent intention to make
delivery. But in England today, apparently intent alone is
enough.0 Delivery has developed, until delivery in escrow' (and
even to the promisee) is permitted.7 A promise is an undertak-
ing that something will or will not happen in the future. This
definition of a promise has not changed through the years. Sign-
'This analysis of the law of contracts has not been that followed
in the past either by casebooks or textbooks, and the restatement of
the American Law Institute makes the situation worse. This is one
reason why there has not been a better understanding of the law of
contracts.
Jackson v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 233 Ill. 161, 84 N.E. 198(1908); Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. (N.Y. 1810) 239.
ORESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 102; Xenos v. Wickham.
(1867) L. R. 2 H. L. 296.
7RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 101.
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ing was not required in earlier law and is not required even to-
day, although it has become a common practice and might very
well today be made a substitute for the old requirement of a seal.
But this reform has not as yet come to pass.
The promise for moral consideration does not require offer
and acceptance, and it is not within the Statute of Frauds; but
it does require a consideration. This consideration, however,
differs from the consideration found in any other kind of con-
tract. The consideration in the promise for moral consideration
is always some antecedent fact or facts; and at the present time
it must consist either of a moral obligation which was once a
legal obligation or of a moral obligation created by the receipt
of prior pecuniary benefits. Lord Mlansfield was really the author
of the doctrine of moral consideration, and with him the only
moral consideration required was that found in the making of
the promise itself (but he apparently applied this rule only in
the case of a promise in writing) ;8 and some of the judges for a
time followed Lord Mansfield. 9 In the period of maturity there
was so much opposition to Lord Mansfield's position that the
doctrine of moral consideration was reduced to cases where
there was a prior legal obligation as in the case of debts dis-
charged by the statute of limitations or by a discharge in bank-
ruptcy.'t In most cases of prior legal obligations there was also
the fact of prior pecuniary benefits received, but' the courts at
this time did not emphasize this fact. However, in the present
period of socialization the receipt of prior pecuniary benefits
has been treated as equally if not more important than a prior
legal obligation, and now there are many courts which have
held that this antecedent fact is sufficient moral consideration to
make a promise enforceable," and recovery will be allowed
'Hawkes v. Saunders, (1782) 1 Cowper 289; Pillans v. Van
Mierop, (1765) 3 Burrows 1663.
' Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N. Y. 604 (1863); Lee v. Muggeridge,
(1813) 5 Taunt. 36.
" Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174 (1879); Earle v. Oliver, (1848)
2 Exch. 71; Eastwood v. Kenyon, (1840) 11 Ad. & E. 438.
" Gray v. Hamil, 82 Ga. 375, 10 S. E. 205 (1889); Holland v. Mar-
tinson, 119 Kan. 43, 237 Pac. 902 (1925); Bagaeff v. Prokopik, 220
Mich. 265, 180 N. W. 427 (1920); Mohr v. Rickgauer, 82 Neb. 398, 117
N. W. 950 (1908); Wilson v. Edwards, 24 N. H. 517 (1852); Bentley v.
Morse, 14 Johns. (N. Y. 1817) 468; Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa. 95 (1868);
Ferguson v. Harris, 39 S. C. 323, 17 S. E. 782 (1893); Edson v. Poppe,
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where pecuniary benefits have been received even though the
transaction is illegal if only rnalun prohibitimn. 12 When this
promise for prior pecuniary benefits is correctly rationalized,
there is also found a rationalization for the case of an act for a
promise. This has given law teachers quite a problem, and they
have tried to rationalize it as a form of bargain contract, either
with an offer of an act accepted by a promise or a bilateral offer
of a promise performed before acceptance by the other party.
Either of these explanations is farfetched and the true rationale
should be that liability here is based on a promise given because
of the receipt of prior pecuniary benefits. 13
The promise injuriously relied on and the promise in the
form of offer and acceptance and for bargain consideration had
a common origin in the action of special assumpsit, but other-
wise there is very little resemblance between them. In the prom-
ise injuriously relied on there is no offer and acceptance, and
no promise within the Statute of Frauds, and the consideration
consists of a subsequent fact or facts. The reason for the devel-
opment of this kind of contract was probably the need of finding
a way to enforce oral promises, in order to supplement the law
of promises under seal which, of course, had to be in writing.
This law was made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
by gradually changing the action of special assumpsit from a
tort action into a contract action through allowing it to lie when
the only wrong was a nonfeasance. But nineteenth century
judges were as much opposed to this kind of law as they were to
the law based on moral consideration, and they tried to get rid
of it. However, there were some promises injuriously relied on
which they had to continue to enforce, like gratuitous promises
to convey land,' 4 gratuitous promises of a license, 1 charitable
subscriptions,'0 gratuitous promises of other gifts,' 7 gratuitous
24 S.D. 466, 124 N. W. 441 (1910); Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681
(1864); Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153 (1909); Park Falls
State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N. W. 516 (1931).
' Brewster v. Banta, 66 N. J. L. 367 (1901).
" For other discussions of this point see Goble, Is an Offer a
Promise? (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 567, and Corbin, The Offer of an
Act for a Promise (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 767.14 AMES, CASES ON EQUITY, 306-309.
' Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F. 2d 138 (1925).
" Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N.
E. 352 (1889).
1
TDevecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 15 Atl. 464 (1889).
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undertakings of bailees s and promises of waiver.19 In the twen-
tieth century the promise injuriously relied upon apparently is
goilng to have some new development, because the Restatement
has extended the law to "a promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
(.an be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 20
The bargain contract was developed in order to supply a
need for a contract containing bilateral promises. This contract
does not require a seal; but does often come within the Statute
of Frauds, requires offer and acceptance and the concurrent
fact of a price given in exchange for a promise. This is called
bargain consideration and this is different from, injurious reli-
ance, which requires a subsequent fact, and from moral consid-
eration, which requires an antecedent fact. The promise in-
juriously relied upon was given a twist so as to make the act
following a promise one that was given in exchange for a prom-
ise and to include a promise as well as an act. It was also prob-
ably influenced by the theory of consideration developed by the
equity courts, and by the requirement of a quid pro quto for the
action of debt. This law which was developed for unilateral
contracts in the seventeenth century 21 and for bilateral con-
tracts in the eighteenth century2  has continued to grow and
develop through the years since that time, until now it is the
most popular and most used form of contract available. But
while it has at various times threatened to supplant the other
kinds of contracts, it should be carefully noted that it did not
succeed in this respect, but all the other forms of contracts
have also continued to endure.
All of the above statements ought to be equally clear to
every student of contracts. Yet casebooks and treatises, instead
"Siegel v. Spear, 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 413 (1923).
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W
400 (1909).
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 90.
"' Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 851 (1842); Freeman v. Freeman, 2
Bulst. 269 (1615).
' The fifth kind of contract recognized by the American Law
Institute as a kind of contract, to wit: the promise of record, has not
been discussed because it is not a contract which parties will employ
when they desire to make contracts with each other. RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 9.
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of treating of these different kinds of contracts separately have
preferred to jumble them altogether under inappropriate head-
ings (e.g., "consideration"), so that the student of contract law
has never acquired the clear comprehension of the law of con-
tracts which he ought to have acquired. Nothing but confusion
and disappointment can result from this practice, and, here-
after, these different kinds of contracts should be not only stud-
ied separately, but they should be studied in the order in which
they have been given above, because this is essentially the chron-
ological order of their origin and development. The last two
kinds of contracts should be studied in close connection because
of their common origin, but the promise injuriously relied on
should be studied first for the aid it will give in understandng
the bargain contract. Some people may think that this is making
contract law too complex. They have made it complex and hard
to understand by attempting to simplify it. It is impossible to
simplify something which is not simple. Here, then, is found a
second key to the understandng of the law of contracts; and it
also is a sort of master key, for it opens a great many doors to
contracts.
III.
A third prerequisite to the understanding of the law of
contracts is learning that contracts is a law of promises and not
a law of agreement. Yet practically all writers on the subject of
contracts, with the exception of 2NMr. Williston, have defined con-
tracts as a law of agreement; and Mr. Williston has taken the
position that the bargain contract is a law of agreement. 23
Everyone will admit that there is no agreement in three kinds of
contracts. [Seal, injurious reliance and moral consideration.]
If there is any agreement at all, it is in the bargain contract.
But modern scholarship has discovered that there is no agree-
ment even in this kind of contract. At first, the English cases
insisted that there must be a meeting of the minds or a subjec-
tive agreement. It almost seemed possible to prove that there
' WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) Secs. 22-23; RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS (1932) Sees. 20-22. 2 BL. COMM. 442 defined contracts as "an
agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a par-
ticular thing." Addison, Anson, Clark, Chipman, Chitty, Elliott, Harri-
man, Lawson, Leake, Parsons, Page, Pollock, Salmond, Story, and
Wharton all define a contract in the terms of an agreement just as
Blackstone did, although they change some of the phraseology of
their definitions in slight respects.
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always was a subjective agreement in bargain contract, until the
parties began to deal with each other from a distance. Then it
became impossible to insist upon this subjective agreement. The
eourts tried to introduce the common agent theory in order to
get such an agreement, 24 but this explanation worked havoc
with the law as to rejection of an offer and to revocation of an
offer, which ignored any common agency hypothesis, and the
cases did worse than introduce a common agent hypothesis; they.
held that there was a contract in the case of a mistake by one or
both of the parties.25 After this there was no use to continue
any pretense that the bargain contract required subjective agree-
ment. Then many judges and law writers began to talk about
objective agreement, but the arguments for objective agreement
are really no better than those for subjective agreement. An
objective agreement without offer and acceptance will amount
to nothing. In the case of cross offers there is both a subjective
and an objective agreement and yet cross offer, "ill not create
a contract.21" It is apparent, therefore, that offer and acceptance
are the fundamental essentials for a bargain contract. Any ob-
je.tive agreement that is found is a mere happenstance. It is a
shadow of offer and acceptance. It is true there always seems
to be this shadow, but, if there could be a case of offer and ac-
ceptance without the shadow, there is little doubt that it would
be enough for a bargain contract so far as this point is con-
cerned. Objective agreement is irrelevant. In deciding whether
or not there is a bargain contract one must find an offer and an
acceptance. He does not need to look for objective agreement.
The important thing in the bargain contract is offer and accep-
tance. In every offer and acceptance there is either one promise
or two promises; and in the other types of contracts there is
always a promise but never an agreement or offer and acceptance.
Therefore, the promise is the important thing. This knowledge
is a key which will unlock many contract doors.
For a contract, it is true, more than a promise is required,
but this is not always the same thing, and it is never agreement.
For one kind of contract there is required a seal and delivery in
addition to a promise; for another kind, moral consideration;
"'Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 1 Barn. & Ald. 681.
", Steinmeyer et al. v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N. E. 564 (1907);
Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495 (1887).
' Tinn v. Hoffman & Co., 29 L. T. R. (N. S.) 271 (1873).
L. J.-2
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for another kind, injurious reliance; and for still another kind,
offer and acceptance and bargain consideration. In none of these
contracts is there "agreement." Some other operative fact or
facts besides a promise are required, but never an agreement.
How absurd under these circumstances to define contract in
terms of agreement!
IV.
A condition precedent to understanding that part of the
law of contracts, found in the law of offer and acceptance, is
the use of the law of powers. We have already said that an offer
must contain a promise. It also creates a power in the offeree
to make a contract according to the terms of the offer.27 The
power may be either a revocable power with no right in the
offeree; or it may be an irrevocable power with no right in the
offeree, as in the case of part performance of an act called for
by the offer of a unilateral contract; or an irrevocable power
and a right, as in the case of an offer in the form of an option.
But in each one of the cases the offeree has the power to make a
bargain contract provided he exercises his power in the case of
a revocable power before it has been revoked. Communication to
the offeree is necessary for the creation of a power in him. An
acceptance is an exercise of the power given to the offeree in the
way he has been authorized to exercise it. The offeree may be
given the power to manifest his acceptance in a great variety
of ways, as by waving a flag, or shooting a gun, or mailing a
letter.2 8 The time, manner and place 29 of his acceptance may be
prescribed. Communication of the acceptance may be prescribed
but unless prescribed it is not necessary because the offeree is
exercising a power given to him.30 When the offeree exercises
his power, he immediately creates a contract, provided there is
also sufficient consideration. It is not necessary to have an
intermediate agreement before there is a contract created. If he
does not exercise the power given to him, and in just the way
authorized, there is no contract. His effort may, however, amount
to a counter-offer. The law of powers solves all the problems of
offer and acceptance, rationalizes the case of cross offers, har-
2' Tayloe v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 390 (1850).
'Trevor, et al. v. Wood, et al., 36 N. Y. 307 (1867).
Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225 (1819).
'"Lennox v. Murphy, 171 Mass. 370, 50 N. E. 644 (1878).
KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE LAw OF CONTRACTS
monizes the law of offer and acceptance with the law of rejection
and revocation of offers, and proves that part performance of an
act in case of an offer of a promise for an act does not constitute
acceptance but destroys the offeror's power of revocation. Hence,
the fourth key is one of the most useful keys to the understand-
ing of the law of contracts, although it only opens one door.
V.
A condition precedent to the understanding of the law of
consideration in the bargain contract is learning that there is
only one theory of bargain consideration, and that is the theory
that such consideration must consist of a right, power, privilege
or immunity either given or promised. There are three kinds of
consideration in Anglo-American law, moral consideration, in-
jurious reliance and bargain consideration. The first type of
consideration requires antecedent facts; the second type subse-
quent facts, and the third type concurrent facts. The first type
of consideration requires benefit to the promisor and the other
two types require detriment to the promisee. Such different kinds
of consideration cannot be considered together. They have little
in common. But when it comes to bargain consideration it has
only one theory. However there are many law writers who have
contended that there are two theories of bargain consideration,
one for forbearance to sue and pre-existing duty cases and an-
other for all other cases.31 It will be possible to show that these
writers are wrong, and that there is really only one theory of
bargain consideration; and that is a right, power, privilege and
imnmunity.
The first proof of this statement is the fact that a right,
power, privilege or immunity given up or promised is always
sufficient consideration for a bargain contract. 32 The second
proof is that in pre-existing duty3 3 and forbearance to sue
eases314 it is expressly held nothing else will amount to bargain
consideration. Where the pre-existing duty is owed to a second
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sees. 75, 76, 85, 86, 87, 90, has
made a sorry mess of this subject.
" Beaumont v. Prieto et al., 249 U. S. 554, 39 S. Ct. 383, 63 L. Ed.
770 (1919); Orr v. Orr, 181 Ill. App. 148 (1913); Hamer v. Sidway,
124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (1919); White v. McMath & Johnson, 127
Tenn. 713, 156 S. W. 470 (1913).
' Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732 (1903).
'Blount v. Wheeler, 199 Mass. 330, 85 N. E. 477 (1908).
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person it is possible to find consideration for a promise of a
third person where it would not be possible to find it for a
second promise by a second person, because of the fact that the
first person is not under a pre-existing duty to the third and,
therefore, has a privilege to try to get a rescission of his con-
tract with the second.3 5 A third proof is found in the fact that
an illusory promise will not amount to sufficient consideration
because the promisor does not promise to give up either a right,
a power, a privilege or an immunity, but only promises to do so
if he chooses to do so. In such cases, of course, there is not even
a promise.36 The fourth proof is found in the fact that there
are no cases holding anything else to be sufficient bargain con-
sideration. It has been contended that infants and other people
who have the power of avoiding their contracts do not promise
to give up a right, power, privilege or immunity but only prom-
ise to do so if they choose. If this was the nature of their prom-
ises, their promises would be illusory and there would be no
contract at all. It is true these parties do have the power of
avoidance of their contract, but if they do not promise to give
up some right, power, privilege or immunity, there would be no
bargain consideration. The power of avoidance has nothing
whatever to do with the matter of consideration. If an infant
or any other person who has the power of avoidance does not in
his original contract either give up or promise to give up a right,
power, privilege or immunity, there is no bargain consideration.
If he does promise to give up one of these things, there is a bar-
gain consideration. In order to make even a voidable contract he
must give up or promise to give up exactly what an adult would
have to do in order to furnish bargain consideration. When he
does this, it is absurd to say that he is furnishing a different kind
of consideration from that which the adult has to furnish. Fur-
ther proof of the soundness of this argument is found in the fact
that an adult at the time he gives up or promises to give up a
right, power, privilege or immunity may reserve a power to
avoid a contract during some short period. Yet in such case
there is no difficulty in finding that the adult has given suffi-
cient bargain consideration and that his promise is not illusory.37
Promises on condition also do not have any separate theory of
De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917).
Great Northern Railway Co. v. Witham, (1873) L. R. 9 C. P. 16.
Gurfein v. Werbelovsky, 97 Conn. 703, 118 Atl. 32 (1922).
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con sideration. In such case a party must promise to give up a
legal right, power, privilege or immunity or there is no suffi-
ient consideration; if he does, there is sufficient consideration.
The fact that the promise is conditional has nothing whatever
to do with the necessity for consideration. 38 Compromise cases
have to be rationalized in the same way. Each party must give
up or promise to give up some part of his right or at least the
privilege to have determined the question of whether or not he
has a right.3"
These four lines of proof abundantly demonstrate that in
Anglo-American law there is only one theory of bargain consid-
eration, and that is a legal right, power, privilege or immunity
given or promised. This is the key to the understanding of the
law of bargain consideration.
VI.
In order to understand the law as to when performance on.
the exact time is a condition.precedent and when it is not, when
part performance is all that is required as a condition precedent
and when full performance is required, and when the satisfaction
of a reasonable man rather than the satisfaction of the defendant
is all that is required as a condition precedent, in case of a
promise to render performance to personal satisfaction, it is
neessary to master the law as to express conditions and con-
structive conditions.
A condition is an operative fact, made a term of a contract,
on the happening or non-happening, performance or non-
performance, of which a duty of immediate performance, or
another condition, is made to depend. An "express condition" is
a fact stated, or written out, in explicit terms. A condition im-
plied by law ("constructive") is one read into the contract by
the courts to meet the needs of justice, because of the assumption
that performance is to be given for performance.
Where time is an express promissory condition precedent
and where time is made of the essence of a contract, either
expressly or by rule of law, the one who has promised to perform
this condition must perform on the exact time or he will be
'Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N. Y. 38 (1871).
;' Seward & Scales v. Mitchell, (1860) 1 Cold. 87; Cook v. Songat,(1588) 1 Leon. 103, 4 Leon. 31.
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guilty of breach of duty, and he will excuse the other party from
his duty of performance.40 Where a promissory condition prece-
dent is express neither substantial nor any other kind of part
performance will fulfill the condition, but the one under duty
must render full and strict performance, 4 1 just as express non-
promissory conditions precedent must happen. 42 Where there is
an express promissory condition precedent of personal satisfac-
tion, whether the contract involves taste, workmanship, sale on
trial, or sale and return, the other party is sole judge as to his
personal satisfaction; and the reasonable man standard is irrele-
vant.43 In all of these cases the rationale is express conditions.
The parties have in exercising their freedom of contract settled
their rights and duties; and the order and method in which they
are to be performed; and the courts will leave the matters where
the parties have put them; they do not feel free to mold the con-
ditions in such a way as to accomplish justice.
But, if in the above typical situations the conditions are
constructive instead of express, a different result will follow.
Where time is not of the essence of the contract, especially in
case of real estate, labor and building contracts, the promisor is
still liable for breach of promise if he does not perform on the
exact time, but by construction of law he has performed all that
is required as a condition precedent if he performs or tenders
performance within a reasonable length of time from the time
fixed, so that he may hold the other party to his performance. 44
Where a promissory condition precedent is such by construction
of law, all that the promisor has to do to put the other party
in default is to perform either a substantial part of his duty or
at least more than half of it, though of course he is still liable
for his breach of promise. He does not have to perform all of
his promise as a condition precedent.45 Where there is a promise
to do something to the personal satisfaction of another, but the
Mazzotta v. Bornstein et al., 104 Conn. 430 (1926).4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 805.
"Martinsburg v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 15 S. Ct. 1035 (1885);
Second National Bank v. Pan American Bridge Co., 183 Fed. 391, 105
C. C. A. 611 (1910).
" Williams Mfg. Co. v. Standard Brass Co., 173 Mass. 356, 53 N.
E. 862 (1899); Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 (1878); Gerisch v.
Herold, 82 N. J. L. 605, 83 Atl. 892 (1912).
"King v. Conners, 222 Mass. 261, 110 N. E. 289 (1915).
"Tickner Bros. v. Evans, 92 Vt. 278, 102 Atl. 1031 (1918); Pick-
ens v. Bozell, 11 Ind. 275 (1858).
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condition is constructive, the question of whether or not the con.
dition has been performed as a condition precedent is answered
by the reasonable man standard; and the other party is not the
sole judge, although he may have a counter claim, for breach of
proraise.413 The rationale for all of these situations is the nature
of constructive conditions. Where the law constructs the condi-
tions it can mold them as it thinks best, so as to make them
accomplish justice. The courts have felt that where it does not
make any material difference to the other party whether or not a
promise is performed at the exact time named for performance a
party should not be punished by being denied all relief against
the other party; that where a person has performed more than
half of his promise he should not be denied all contract recovery
but should be allowed to require the other party to begin per-
formance, with an allowance in the way of a counter claim for
any injury; and that where a person has promised to perform
to the personal satisfaction of another, justice requires that the
other party should act as a reasonable man. The way to accom-
plish all of these results is to mold the constructive condition so
as to require only the kind of performance which has been indi-
cated. This does not allow one party to take advantage of the
other but undertakes to give each of them what is justly due him.
Express and constructive conditions are a key to the understand-
ing of the most bothersome problems of performance.
VII.
In order to understand the law of assignment, the law of
waiver, and the law of breach, a mastery of the law as to promis-
sory conditions and non-promissory conditions is necessary.
A "non-promissory" or "casual condition" is a fact other
than a promise which merely suspends a duty of immediate
performance, or another condition, until it happens or extin-
guishes such duty, or condition, upon its happening. A "promis-
sory condition" is a promise in a bilateral contract which either
suspends the duty of immediate performance of another promise
until it is performed, or extinguishes such duty on its perform-
ance. It also creates a right-duty relation and if breached gives
rise to a secondary duty.
Bridgeford & Co. v. Meagher, 144 Ky. 479, 139 S. W. 750 (1911);
Janssen v. Muller, 38 S. D. 611, 162 N. W. 393 (1917).
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Rights are capable of assignment unless in some way the
assignment of a right varies the duty of the promisor or the as-
signment has been forbidden by statute, public policy, or con-
tract. 47 Privileges and powers are not capable of assignment. 4x A
promissory condition creates a right and a privilege; a non-
promissory creates only a privilege (or power). It therefore fol-
lows that non-promissory conditions can never be assigned, but
promissory conditions may be assigned. However, anyone taking
such a right takes it subject to any conditions, promissory or non-
promissory, which affected it before the assignment. 4 '
A right can not be waived. 50 Because of the establishment
of this principle it has been contended that there is no such thing
as a waiver; that what we have called waiver has been either
estoppel, 51 or election,5 " or a new contract.53 Probably this view
is correct so far as concerns rights, but privileges, powers and
immunities can be waived. Any number of these are guaranteed
by federal and state constitutions, but they have been held subject
to waiver.5 4 The powers and privileges created by offers and
the power of avoidance of a contract may be waived.5 5 Hence,
it is seen that there is still such a thing as a waiver, and it has
not been distributed; but it should be redefined as a voluntary
relinquishment of a privilege, power or immunity. Non-promis-
sory conditions create only privileges or powers and, therefore,
of course, can be waived.5 6 Promissory conditions create rights
as well as privileges and, therefore, the rights can not be waived,
but the conditions or privileges parts of the promissory conditions
may be waived.5 7 Prevention may amount to a waiver of a condi-
' Jemison v. Tindall, 89 N. J. L. 429, 99 Atl. 408 (1916).
" Marston v. Carter, 12 N. H. 159 (1841); Boulton v. Jones, (1857)
2 H. & N. 564.
"Homer v. Shaw, 212 Mass. 113, 98 N. E. 697 (1912); American
Bridge Co. et al. v. Boston, 202 Mass. 374, 88 N. E. 1089 (1909).
' Foakes v. Beer, (1884) L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605.
" Jobst v. Hayden Bros., 84 Neb. 735, 121 N. W. 957 (1909).
" Catholic Foreign Missionary Society of America v. Cussani, 215
N. Y. 1, 109 N. E. 80 (1915).
1 Shallenberger v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 223 Pa. 220, 72
Atl. 500 (1909).
5'Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253 (1930).
1 Wittwer'v. Hurwitz, 216 N. Y. 259, 110 N. E. 433 (1915).
1 Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Pitcher, 160 Ind. 392, 64 N. E. 921
(19.02).57Craig v. Lane, 212 Mass, 195, 98 N. E. 685 (1912).
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tion.58 A prevention by the promisee of the promisor of a promis-
sory condition precedent will amount to a waiver of the condition
and a breach by the promisee. 59 Prevention by the promisor of
himself of a promissory condition precedent will amount to a
breach and in the case of a concurrent condition will excuse
performance by the other party.6 °
A breach is a legal wrong. For this reason, there can be no
breach of a non-promissory or the non-promissory phase of a
promissory condition and it makes no difference whether the
condition is express or constructive, precedent, concurrent or sub-
sequent. But in the case of promissory conditions, whether
express or constructive, precedent, concurrent or subsequent, a
breach may arise either by failure of performance, 61 or by pre-
Vention,"12 or by repudiation.63 Thus, it is seen that the key to un-
derstanding the problems of law involved in these topics is a
mastery of the distinction between promissory and non-promis-
xiorv conditions.
VIII.
In order to understand the law of pleading and proof of the
performance and happening of conditions it is necessary to
understand precedent, concurrent and subsequent conditions.
A "precedent condition " is a fact (generally an act) which
must occur before the duty of hmnediate performance of a
promise, or another condition, arises. A "concurrent condition"
is a fact which must occur at the same moment as the duty of
immediate performance of a promise (performance on each side,
simultaneous). A "subsequent condition" is a fact which must
,ceur after another condition, or the duty of immediate perform-
ane of a promise has arisen.
The plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving condi-
tions precedent, except in the case of insurance contracts. The
performance or happening of these conditions is necessary to his
cause of action and it makes no difference whether the conditions
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218 Fed.
353, 134 C. C. A. 161 (1914).
"Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472 (1912).
"Clark v. Gulesian, 197 Mass. 492, 84 N. E. 94; Mary Short v.
Stone, (1846) 8 Q. B. 358.
Bettini v. Gye, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 183.
' Canada v. Wicks, 100 N. Y. 127, 2 N. E. 381 (1885).
Torkomain, Jr. v. Russell, et al., 90 Conn. 481, 97 Ati. 760
(1916).
KENTTCKY LAW JOURNAL
are express or constructive, promissory or non-promissory. 64 The
plaintiff also has the burden of pleading and proving a readiness
and willingness to perform promissory concurrent conditions,
because this is necessary to his cause of action. The defendant
has the burden of pleading and proving the performance or
happening of all conditions subsequent, because they are a matter
of defense and terminate'a right which the plaintiff would other-
wise have, 65 and for practical reasons, the happening of condi-
tions precedent in insurance cases."6
Ix.
In order to understand the law of so called impossibility, it
is necessary to learn that there must be read into contracts a
condition based on a hypothesis of a mutual assumption as to
some matter which is either the basis of a contract or the basis of
performance of a contract.
In Anglo-American law there really is no such thing as im-
possibility. The common law permits parties to promise the
impossible. It also does not make future impossibility a defence
to the performance of a contract. Impossibility as such has no
operative effect either to prevent the making of a contract or to
discharge a contractY7 But where the parties have dealt on a
mutual assumption either as to some matter of law or some
matter of fact as a basis either for their contract or for their
performance, the courts, if this becomes impossible or imprac-
ticable, will read into a contract a non-promissory constructive
condition, generally subsequent, to discharge either another non-
promissory or a promissory condition. This rationale was
developed by Justice Blackburn in the Queen's Bench Court in
England in 1863 and has become English and American law ever
since. 68
The following are illustrations of some non-promissory
McGowin v. Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877 (1918).
Wilmington & R. R. Co. v. Hobeson, 27 N. C. 391 (1845); North
Western National Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 56 Okla. 188, 155 Pac. 524
(1916).
" Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co., 86 Conn. 15 (1912).
01Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn. 392, 103 Atl. 114 (1918); Fargo,
et al. v. Wade, 72 Ore. 477, 142 Pac. 830 (1914); King v. Braine,
(1597) Owen 60
'Hawkes v. Kehoe, et al., 193 Mass.'419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907);
Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 3 Best and S. 826.
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conditions discharged by this kind of a constructive non-promis-
sory condition subsequent. An express non-promissory condition
precedent of an architect's certificate is discharged by a con-
structive non-promissory condition subsequent, of death, or
collusion, or spite, where the parties have dealt on a mutual
assumption that the architect will continue to live or will not be
guilty of collusion or spite.0 9 The express non-promissory condi-
tion subsequent of forfeiture for non-payment of insurance
premiums on time is discharged or suspended by a constructive
non-promissory condition subsequent of war where the parties
have dealt on the mutual assumption of peace.
70
A constructive promissory condition precedent of the lease
of a music hall is discharged by a constructive non-promissory
condition subsequent of the destruction of the music hall when the
parties have dealt on the mutual assumption of its continued
existence. 71 A constructive promissory condition precedent of
work is discharged by a constructive non-promissory condition
subsequent of death because the parties have dealt on the mutual
assumption of continuing life.72 A duty to give an annual pass is
discharged by a constructive non-promissory condition subse-
quent of a law prohibiting the issuance of passes where the parties
have dealt on the mutual assumption that there would be no such
law. 73 A constructive promissory condition precedent to build a
floor in a building is discharged by a constructive non-promissory
condition subsequent of the destruction of the building where
the parties have dealt on the mutual assumption of the continued
existence of the building.7 4
Thus it is seen that the key to understanding the de-
cisions of the courts in all these cases is the mutual assumption
which the courts find as a fact for the basis of reading a con-
structive condition into the contract.
X.
In order to understand the law of assignment, it is again
necessary to make use of the law of powers.
' Martinsburg & P. R. Co. v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 50 S. Ct. 1035
(1885); Heben v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403, 77 N. E. 822 (1906).
' Cohen v. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610 (1872).
7Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 3 Best & S. 826.
Yerrington v. Greene, et al., 7 R. I. 589 (1863).
SLouisville & N. R. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S. W. 759
(1913).
.4 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 Pac. 143 (1917).
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The common law did not permit the assignment or the sale
of intangibles with certain exceptions in favor of the crown, ex-
ecutors and administrators, assignees, bankruptcy, bills of ex-
change and promissory notes and convenants running with the
land. This may have been a sad commentary on the common law
but nevertheless this was the common law. However, the com-
mon law did permit the owner of an intangible right to give to
another person whom we will call an assignee a power to collect
a debt and to promise not to revoke the power and to allow the
assignee to keep the proceeds after collection.7 5 Yet this was not
an effective way to get around the rule against assignment, be-
cause the common law held that such power was revocable either
by the assignor or by bankruptcy and that the assignor could
appoint other agents. Because of this ineffectiveness equity took
jurisdiction, not at once to permit a sale of or assignment of an
intangible, but to specifically enforce the covenant not to revoke
a power and to protect the assignee against all who had not re-
duced the intangible to possession in good faith, but the conse-
quence of this was to make the assignee the equitable owner.7 '
After this the common law adopted the equity rule and modern
statutes have required the assignee to sue in his own name. As a
consequence, the assignee became at law not only the equitable
owner, but probably also the legal owner upon condition of giv-
ing notice to the debtor, as against the debtor; and upon condi-
tion of exercising his power before any subsequent assignee ex-
ercises a power given to him as against subsequent assignees.
77
Thus, in spite of the early common law, intangibles have be-
come completely assignable, or saleable, unless such assignment
is prohibited by contract or by some rule of public policy, or by
some rule of personality, but tle key to the understanding of all
this historical development and present law is the law of
powers.
",Redfield v. Hillhouse, 1 Root. 63 (1774).
-1Unwin v. Oliver (1739), cited in Burr. 481.
-'Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., et al., 264 U.
S. 182, 44 S. Ct. 266 (1924); Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233(1816); Winch v. Keeley, (1787) 1 Term. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284;
Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 816,(.1917) 30 HARv. L. REV. 449.
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XI.
In order to understand the law of third party beneficiaries
it is necessary again to make use of freedom of contract.
The English common law had a difficult time in coming to
a decision as to whether rights could be given in a contract to
third party beneficiaries. The strict period judges were
divided on the question. The period of equity judges permitted
this to be done.7 8 But the period of maturity judges came to
the decision that this was impossible,7 9 because of a notion which
they had as to privity of contract. In the United States the
judges in the period of socialization have gradually come to the
conclusion that contract rights may be given to third party
beneficiaries, whether they are creditor 0 beneficiaries or donee
beneficiaries."' The U. S. Courts found a rationale for this
position by cutting through the red tape of privity of contract
and holding in common sense fashion that the parties to the con-
tract could create these rights in third parties under their free-
dom of contract. They have the power to create rights and
duties, and it makes no difference whether they give such rights
to themselves or to third persons.
XII.
In order to understand the effect of the Statute of Frauds
it is necessary to adopt the theory of the voidability of contracts
for failure to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
There has been much dispute as to the effect of the Statute
of Frauds. Some have taken the position that it simply makes a
contract unenforceable by touching the subject of evidence.8 2
Others have taken the view that the Statute effects the remedy
and only the remedy8 3 The fact that the Statute affects more
than evidence is proven by the fact that a memorandum to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds must be executed before a suit is in-
stituted. s 4 The fact that the statute affects something besides
"Dutton v. Poole, (1677) 2 Levinz 210.
Tweedle v. Atkinson, (1861) 1 Best and S. 393.
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
' National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1818); Teaver v
Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918).
"Reuber v. Negles, 147 La. 374 (1910); Maddison v. Alderson,
(1883) 8 App. Cas. 467.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) Sec. 527.
" Lucas v. Ditson, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 357.
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a remedy is also proven by the fact that even when a case comes
within the Statute of Frauds the plaintiff can recover unless the
defendant affirmatively pleads the Statute of Frauds. If he
does not so plead, it may as well be said that the contract is valid
and the plaintiff has both remedial and antecedent rights. What
then is the true rationale of the Statute of Frauds? It is suh-
mitted that the correct rationale is that the Statute of Frauds
gives a defendant the privilege and the power to avoid his con-
tract if it comes within the Statute of Frauds, by so pleading,
just as the law gives an infant and parties on whom fraud has
been practiced the privilege and power of avoiding their con-
tractss 5 Since the statute gives a party the privilege to avoid
his contract, he may do so by pleading the Statute of Frauds.
However, he may either exercise or waive this privilege. He may
waive his privilege by not pleading the Statute of Frauds. He
may exercise his privilege, for example, in case of two oral con-
tracts to sell the same land, by executing a conveyance to the
second vendee who thus acquires the legal title, through avoid-
ance of the first contract, even though he had notice of the prior
oral agreement with the first vendee. If, however, a memoran-
dum is given to the first vendee before giving a conveyance to the
second vendee the party waives his privilege of avoiding his con-
tract by the exercise of his power to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds by a memorandum.8 6 The key to the understanding of the
effect of the Statute, therefore, is that it makes any oral contract
within the statute voidable and gives to the party the privilege
and power of either avoiding or ratifying the contract.
Now that the author has finished his rationale of the law of
contracts and offered it to the public, there may be those who will
say that what he has done is to give a rationale of the law as it has
been rather than as it is going to be; that what we want are some
keys to unlock the secrets of the future not those of the past; that
if the judges make law, the thing to do is to study the personality
'Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., 294 Fed. 176 (1923); First
National Bank of Maringo, Iowa v. Blair State Bank, et al., 80 Neb.
400, 114 N. W. 409 (1907); Abraham v. Durward, 46 N. D. 611, 180
N. W. 783 (1920).
'Van Cloostere v. Logan, 149 fl1. 588, 36 N. E. 946 (1894); Peck
v. Williams, 113 Ind. 256, 15 N. E. 270 (1887).
KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
of the particular judges-their political affiliations, their re-
ligious views, economic theories, emotional constitution, health
etc.; that if pressure groups (e.g. business) make law, the thing
to do is to study them; and that if the parties to contracts make
the law, as this article admits so far as concerns substance, the
thing to do is to study them.
There is both an impirical science of law (law in action)
and a formal science of law (law in discourse). Law is only
partly imraediate decisions, but in a large sense what any and all
judges will decide. Judges make the law. The law in any par-
tieular case is what the judge, or judges, will make the law in that
case. This law is retrospective, and accurate legal prediction is
therefore impossible. Guesses as to decisions can be made on the
basis of precedents, statistics, reports of committees, scientifie
opinions and the personality of the judge. But if one is going to
state the law, or rationalize the law, it cannot be done on the basis
of anything other than the precedents, and this is the most im-
portant factor in making guesses. If any other law were to be
taiught in our law schools we would have no law schools. At least
their curricula would be too short to amount to much, and all
principles and rules would always tend to vanish into thin air.
As decisions are rendered in specific cases there is gradually
built up a body of what is called law-contracts, torts, crimes,
property, etc. This law is not the major premise for the de-
cision of new cases, but it is a rationalization of all the old de-
cisions and it will have a major influence upon judges when they
come to decide new specific cases. This is the formal science of
law. It is just as much law as the impirical science of law; and
it is the only law which can be rationalized and taught in law
schools. Of course a study of the characteristics and idiosyn-
crasies of judges, pressure groups and parties to contracts
should not be neglected, at least by practitioners, but there are
many different judges, pressure groups and parties all of the
time and they are constantly changing with the future. By this
study help may be gained in guessing what a decision may be in
a particular case, but there will be no scientific basis even for
this, and generalizations will be impossible. Freedom of con-
tract can be taught but it would be impossible to teach what kind
of contracts parties will make. So far as the law is formulated
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and rationalized it must be the formal not the impirical science
of law.
The impirical science of law studies sociological and psycho-
logical phenomena. The formal science of law is propositional,
uses formal logic, and deals with certainty. Both grow and
change. As defined and taught law must be used in the sense of
law in discourse. So defined it is a prediction of what the
judges will do, not in the sense of the neo-realists but in the
sense of Cardozo and Holmes. It is not a specific decision for a
specific case, but it is a hypothetical conclusion. It is not a com-
mand by a superior to an inferior, but it is a by-law of the
people. It is not a binding precedent, but it will help to make
law in a specific case more than anything else. It is not a natural
law found by the judges, but a natural law which the judges
tend to make. It is a body of hypotheses, theories, doctrines.
principles and rules made by executives, legislators, judges,
writers and teachers on the basis of past decisions and general-
izations and rationalizations from them, and the scheme of social
control resulting from putting them all together and applying
them to individuals.
In contracts, there are many changes and what lie regards
as improvements which the writer thinks ought to be made. lie,
for 'example, thinks the statute of frauds has outlived its useful-
ness and should be abolished. He thinks the private seal has be-
come obsolete and that a person's signature should be substituted
for it in the formal contract. He thinks that no consideration at
all should be required for any promise in writing. But he is not
prepared to prophesy that these or any other changes are going
to be made by the judges in the law of contracts. Others might
desire more freedom of contract and other changes in the law of
contracts than the writer would, but they cannot predict that the
judges will take their viewpoint. In some branches of the law
(e.g., constitutional law) because of general trends in the law
and because of the long tenure 'of judges whose personalities are
known it is easier to anticipate and prophesy future changes, but
there is no such place for it in contracts. For this reason the
writer admits that the keys named herein are not keys to the
understanding of the impirical science of law but of the formal
science of law.
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